Rubinstein bargaining model

A Rubinstein bargaining model refers to a class of bargaining games that feature alternating offers through an infinite time horizon. The original proof is due to Ariel Rubinstein in a 1982 paper.[1] For a long time, the solution to this type of game was a mystery; thus, Rubinstein's solution is one of the most influential findings in game theory.

Contents

Requirements

A standard Rubinstein bargaining model has the following elements:

Solution

Although there are many different methods to solving the game, one of the simpler ones involves extending the ultimatum game to increasingly many counteroffers. The subgame perfect equilibrium offer for any number of periods begins to form a geometric series. Thus, we can extend the solution to infinitely many periods by solving for a geometric series. If d is a common discount factor, then the first player earns 1/(1+d) and the second player earns d/(1+d) in equilibrium.[2]

Desirability

Rubinstein bargaining has become pervasive in the literature because it has many desirable qualities:

References

  1. ^ Rubinstein, Ariel (1982). "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model". Econometrica 50 (1): 97–109. doi:10.2307/1912531. http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/11.pdf. 
  2. ^ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EunqjqDR9_w